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BOOK COMMENTARY
THE RIGHTS OF MAN TODAY. By Louis Henkin. 1 Boulder:
Westview Press, 1978.

Reviewed by Irwin P. Stotzky*
At a time when the issue of human rights has become proper
fare in the relations between competing nation-states, it is perhaps
more than appropriate to examine the origins and sources of the concept, to explore the paths human rights have traveled in the past, and
to look at the future direction in which the human rights movement
may lead. An American scholar, Professor Louis Henkin, in his book
entitled The Rights of Man Today, has recently taken a hard look at
the historical effort to establish and maintain such rights. Professor
Henkin begins his exploration of the topic with an historical analysis
of its evolution. He then moves to a discussion of the rise of constitutionalism, the mode used to spread and universalize the idea of
human rights within almost all nation-states. Professor Henkin next
examines the international movement to promote and protect human
rights through exertion of intergovernmental pressure. Finally, he allows us a glimpse of the future actions which may be needed in order
to secure the rights of man for the as-of-yet unborn masses.
The book should be especially impressive to those who, like the
present writer, tend to be interested in broad social alternatives and
the slow upward rise of man, but are less conversant with the intricacies of the international order and the history of human rights on
a global scale. Many readers with these tastes might have hoped for
research like Professor Henkin's, but would have been hard put to
find a candidate for it. It required a combination of vision, optimism,
pertinacity, intellectual flexibility, and, most of all, pragmatic good
sense. Distance without disinvolvement was needed-sympathy with
people and nations everywhere, yet suspicion of their irregularities;
awareness of a cultural debt to Democratic Western Societies without
contempt for the Socialist and other third world alternatives, however
repugnantly phrased they may appear to an American steeped in the
"democratic" tradition; and, perhaps most important of all, a readiness to take up the contradictions inherent in the human rights
movement. There was also a need to pull together an incredibly wide
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law.
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range of subjects involved in this field. Professor Henkin's essay successfully meets the demands of his enterprise. No pains that could be
taken were avoided by Professor Henkin; no subjects in this highly
disparate field that could be exploited were left untouched. The result of this effort is, therefore, highly impressive.
The book, however, has its flaws. Plainly, Professor Henkin has
rendered a singular service in writing this book. Both the times and
circumstances call loudly for such an essay. But I must register a note
of skepticism about the results of his effort. One is left with the distinct impression that there is lacking a theoretical structure which
links the several parts of his essay. Stated another way, it is not at all
clear that the forces he describes to explain the spread of basic
human rights were their only cause nor does he sufficiently explain
why the next 200 years will witness a further increase in the protection of such rights. He merely works at the level of characterization
and description, and it may be doubted that the matter can be settled
at that level. Yet Professor Henkin never claims to do anything more
than to "describe and diagnose the effort to establish and maintain
human rights in our time." 2 Taken on its own terms, therefore, the
essay is a success.

Thomas Paine wrote the Rights of Man in 1791-92. The principles enunciated in his book-principles of individual autonomy,
popular sovereignty and social contract-are employed by Professor
Henkin as the point of departure for his discussion of human rights.
Initially, Professor Henkin defines human rights as:
claims asserted and recognized "as of right," not claims upon love,
or grace, or brotherhood, or charity: one does not have to earn or
deserve them. They are not merely aspirations or moral assertions
but, increasingly, legal claims under some applicable law.
Human rights, I stress, are rights against society as represented by government and its officials. 3
By this definition, of course, we are initially limited in our perceptions and interpretations of human rights as a concept. By this definition, Professor Henkin bypasses volumes of literature concerning one
of the most fundamental quandaries in all of philosophy-the nature

2. L.

HENKIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN TODAY XIV (1978).

3. Id. at 1-2.
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and scope of rights and duties, their origins, meanings, and authority.
By this definition, I would argue, the author thereby misses an opportunity to delve into the deeper mysteries of a human rights
theory. Stated another way, it seems to one uninitiated in international law that Professor Henkin misses an opportunity to discuss the
strands of a theory that would more adequately explain how a concept
of human rights developed, nurtured, and grew, and most importantly, how it will continue its ascent into the future. Through the
process of definitional limits, therefore, the author becomes the
chronicler of a journey rather than a theoretician and constructor of
an evolving concept. Hence, I am initially uneasy about his essay.
Notwithstanding this initial limitation, it is nevertheless intriguing to note his description of the evolution of a human rights concept.
Professor Henkin sets up the evolution of human rights through the
analytical construct of thesis-antithesis-synthesis; to Professor Henkin,
human rights are viewed as a "twentieth-century synthesis of an
eighteenth-century thesis and a nineteenth-century antithesis." 4 The
eighteenth century thesis of "natural rights" was made "secular, rational, universal, individual and democratic," through the American
and French revolutions, and their declarations. Viewed through this
perspective, therefore, governmental authority has implied limits
which preserve private autonomy against governmental infringement.
Moreover, some of these rights are inalienable; they cannot be subordinated to the government:
There are, it is predicated, certain principles of right and justice which are entitled to prevail of their own intrinsic excellence
altogether regardless of the attitude of those who wield the physical resources of the Community. Such principles were made by no
human hands; indeed, if they did not antedate deity itself, they
still so express its nature as to bind and control it. They are external to all Will as such and interpenetrate all Reason as such. They
are eternal and immutable. In relation to such principles, human
laws are, when entitled to obedience save as to matters indifferent,
merely a record or transcript, and their enactment an act not of
will or power but one of discovery and declaration. 5
Under this theory, the retention of individual rights against governmental interference is reflected in a mythical and hypothetical social contract between man and government. It is at this point that
4. Id. at 5.
5. Corwin, The "Higher Low" Background of American Constitutional Law, 42
HARV. L. REv. 149, 152 (1928-29).
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Professor Henkin's essay has a structural weakness; that is, Professor
Henkin misses the opportunity to question the origins of his concept
of human rights by failing to question the validity of the social contract theory. For example, there are very respectable authorities
which disclaim the validity of the social contract theory. 6 Yet Professor Henkin does not even make reference to these competing
theories. Through this omission, the reader is left to wonder whether
a theory of human rights rests upon quite a different foundation than
that constructed by the author. Furthermore, a comparison with
other theories of the creation of the state might lead to contradictory
theories of human rights or it might show the strength of Professor
Henkin's theory. The curious reader will never know the answer from
Professor Henkin's essay.
Instead of presenting competing theories explaining the creation
of the state and human rights, Professor Henkin forges ahead with a
discussion of the content of these rights, correctly claiming that the
birth date of human rights, the eighteenth century, gave shape to
their content. Indeed, within the content of eighteenth century rights
were such Lockean concepts as life, liberty and property, and the
additional concept of the pursuit of happiness written about in the
Declaration of Independence. At this point, I must once again register a note of concern about what Professor Henkin leaves out of his
discussion. It is curious that Professor Henkin accepts the content of
these rights without questioning their validity, since much scholarly
writing exists in opposition to this perspective. For example, many
Marxists view the Lockean definition of rights as a reaffirmation and
protection of the propertied classes. Thus, to the Marxist, the
Lockean notion of rights is not necessarily acceptable. 7 Yet, Professor Henken fails even to acknowledge this perspective.
Dismissing this omission, it is nevertheless interesting to note
that Professor Henkin's view of eighteenth century rights finds expression in the American Constitution. For example, it was widely
believed that certain principles of right and justice reconciled individual liberty and governmental power by identifying their respective
roles and spheres of authority within society. More specifically, each

6. Professor Ronald Dworkin argues that citizens have individual rights against
the State which arise not from the social contract as usually conceived, but from our
status as "moral beings." R. DvORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
7. See, e.g., C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE
INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO LOCKE (1962).

BOOK COMMENTARY

level and branch of government was seen as confined to its own
sphere of authority, which was in turn defined by the nature and
function of that level or branch and by the inherent rights of citizens.
Thus, the three branches of the federal government were required to
remain within their proper sphere of power. In a like manner, the
state or federal government was required to remain within its proper
sphere and thus was barred from intruding upon the prerogratives of
other governmental departments, or more importantly, upon the
"natural rights" inherent in their citizenship-including personal liberty, security, and private property- reserved to the people. Furthermore, these rights were to be preserved as part of the social contract between citizen and government. Interestingly enough, these
conceptions took root and flowered within the rich soil of judicial lit8
erature.
The Federal and State Constitutions were, however, less than
the archetypical protectors of natural rights. Indeed, there were several glaring omissions in the constitutions: the concepts of equality,
and economic and social rights were left unmentioned. Some of these
defects were remedied by later amendments. In addition, according
to Professor Henkin, the French Revolution and Declaration became
symbolic bulwarks for the protection of economic and social rights
and for equality. Moreover, it was intriguing for this writer to discover that the French legacy was probably more influential than the
American in spreading the human rights ideology throughout the
world. 9
The second element in Professor Henkin's structure is the
nineteenth century antithesis. According to Professor Henkin, the
eighteenth century ideology of human rights and popular sovereignty
met a contrary tendency-its antithesis-in the nineteenth century.
First, natural rights based on divine natural law ran head on into
rationalism, secularism and humanism; the theory of evolution was
particularly destructive to the underpinnings of a theory which
viewed all people as "children of God." In a like manner, positivism
dealt a stunning blow to natural law on a jurisprudential level.
The second antithetical element to an eighteenth century ideology of natural rights came from the concept of Socialism. While the
individual rights theory emphasized rights against society, socialist
8. See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386 (1798); Fletcher v. Peck, 10
U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810); Terret v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815).
9. The United States Constitution was, of course, more influential in Latin
America than the French legacy.
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theory emphasized duties to the state. Thus, under a socialist state,
the greatest honor for the individual was seen as service to the state;
the individual good was replaced by the good of the masses. In this
manner, both society and the individual received benefits. The
Socialist antithesis to individual rights implied, therefore, an activist
government which had as its main duty the securing of economic advancement for the masses.
The third element in the argument-the synthesis between conflicting eighteenth century rights and antithetical nineteenth century
forces-came in the twentieth century. Today, according to Professor
Henkin, "sovereignty of the people is denied nowhere, asserted
everywhere." 10 Constitutionalism has become the means to protect
equality, liberty and justice. Yet Professor Henkin seems to overstate
this point. If "sovereignty of the people is denied nowhere, asserted
everywhere," 11 how does one explain the extermination of millions of
people in Cambodia; how does one explain the Soviet Union's treatment of certain minorities such as Jewish "refusniks"; how does one
explain the system of apartheid in South Africa; how does one explain
"political prisoners" within the United States? 1 2 Clearly, these
are
not mere aberrations. Even if sovereignty of the people is proclaimed
in theory, in almost all nation-states it is denied, in various degrees,
in fact.
Although slightly overstating the importance of constitutionalism
in his analysis, Professor Henkin is correct in noting that a constitution was a most useful device in protecting human rights and was,
moreover, a strong link in the twentieth century synthesis. The main
impetus in the synthesis was a remarkable philosophical development:
the resurrection of natural law and natural rights and the quiescence
of positivism. Natural human rights were converted through the alchemy of a written constitution into positive legal rights. The prime
example, once again, is the American Constitution. Within its orbit,
certain natural rights have become positive legal rights, and some of
the Justices have read the totality of the Constitution as a guarantor
of fundamental rights-rights that stemmed from the social compact

10. L. HENKIN, supra note 2, at 18-19.
11. id.
12. The point is not that the United States is in the same category as Cambodia,
the Soviet Union or South Africa in the mistreatment of people and their human
rights, but that the nation most dedicated to the protection of human rights is, at
times, not free from the charge of violating those very rights it so loudly proclaims as
fundamental.
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and hence did not need any explicit textual support. Justice Chase's
opinion in Calder v. Bull 13 makes the point. In that case, the Court
rejected an attack on a Connecticut legislative act setting aside a probate court decree which had failed to approve a will, resulting in a
second hearing at which the will was approved. The challenge to the
legislative act came from the heirs who would have taken the property if the will had been ineffective. The Supreme Court rejected the
heirs' ex post facto claims and held that the clause applied only to
criminal laws. But more important for present purposes was the willingness of some Justices to entertain arguments on natural law
grounds. Justice Chase, for example, expressed a willingness in a
proper case to prevent a legislature from intruding upon private
property or contract rights even if not "expressly restrained by the
"14 Moreover, "a law that destroys, or impairs, the
Constitution .
lawful private contracts of citizens; a law that makes a man a Judge in
his own cause; or a law that takes property from A and gives it to
B," 15 according to Justice Chase, would be invalid since it exceeds
the proper authority of government.' 8 Thus, in this manner, the
Constitution preserved and protected natural rights.
A second significant step in the transformation of natural rights
into positive legal rights, according to Professor Henkin, came with
the development of international agreements containing human rights
norms which purported to be binding on the parties. Since World
War II, there has been a significant growth of such agreements.
Moreover, all of these agreements possess a common denominator:
they all purport to bind nation-states regardless of their own constitutions or other laws. But world events clearly belie this assumption;
other national interests intrude and assume preeminence to the detriment of international human rights.
The final twentieth century synthesis outlined by Professor
Henkin is that between liberty and welfare. To Professor Henkin, the
twentieth century has brought together the competing interests of the
individual, his autonomy and liberty, and the emphasis on the group
and on economic and social welfare for all; it "has seen essentially

13. 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386 (1798).
14. id. at 386 (1798) (Chase, J., seriatim opinion).
15. Id. at 388 (emphasis supplied). Justice Chase found that the probate court's
initial decree had not conferred vested property rights upon the heirs under
Connecticut law. Thus, the Connecticut legislature did not exceed its proper scope of
authority.
16. For a more modern day judicial discussion of the perceived limits of governmental power, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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universal acceptance of human rights in principle, and general
agreement on its content." 17 This does not mean, of course, that
human rights are enjoyed and respected to the same degree in every
nation-state. Professor Henkin makes a more modest claim:
The significance of these intellectual-political developments for
the actual condition of the individual should not be exaggerated,
but neither should it be underestimated. Philosophical resistance
to human rights has been essentially eliminated, and political resistance invoking philosophical resistance has been undermined.
Popular sovereignty may not be meaningfully reflected in many
societies, but as a universal principle it lies ever in the wings ready
to be asserted and vindicated. Within nations, even socialism now
acquiesces in limitations on government and cannot resist all claims
for political-civil rights, and capitalist-bourgeois-libertarian states
are irrevocably committed to economic and social welfare for all as
of right. In international society, the most "sovereign," the most
impermeable of states cannot exclude all external scrutiny.' 8
II
Part II of Professor Henkin's essay is a description of the constitutions that have evolved in the various nation-states of the world
and their importance as sources of protection for human rights.
Nation-states differ, of course, in their commitment to human rights.
According to Professor Henkin, these differences may be explained
by the political ideologies and institutions of the particular state.
These different ideologies and institutions are, in turn, reflective of
different conceptions of, and commitments to, human rights. And national constitutions are the devices which mirror the manner in which
the scale of values concerning human rights are weighed in any given
society.
This writer has absolutely no quarrel with this part of Professor
Henkin's essay except to say that it appears a bit too one dimensional
an explanation for the international spread of human rights. Many
forces that have shaped human history are merely glossed over or
never mentioned. Take, for example, his characterization and grouping of the different political systems in the world. Professor Henkin
groups "constitutions, and the political-social-economic systems and
the attitudes toward individual rights that thcy reflect" 19 into three
17. L.

HENKIN,

18. Id.at 30.
19. Id. at 33-34.

supra note 2, at 27.
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(Western), socialist-communist, and
models: "democratic-libertarian
'other"' (third world). 20 Such a catalogue presents its own inherent
problems. The vitality of a constitution in any specific society and the
other forces which shape that society political, social, and
economic-are given too short a turn. On the other hand, because of
the large number and differences of nation-states and constitutions,
some generalizations are necessary. In sum, this section of the book
has exposed the present writer to much needed information about the
world order and, on that basis alone, is worthy of high praise.
III
Concern for individuals in other countries and their conditions is
not a new phenomenon. But individual human rights were not the
grist of international politics or law until after the Second World War.
To Professor Henkin, therefore, World War II is the birth date of the
international human rights movement.
More specifically, Nazi activities and the high toll of life activated
a greater international concern for human rights. This increased concern for human rights, in turn, was reflected in the plans made for
the postwar world. Thus, when the war ended, human rights obligations became part and parcel of the peace treaties. Prosecutions for
war crimes-unspeakable crimes against individuals and their
rights-saw fruition in the Nuremberg trials, and human rights were
safeguarded in the new constitutions and laws of the defeated
nations-West Germany, Japan, and Austria. There remained, however, a basic flaw in the spread of human rights requirements: they
were not necessarily applicable to the victors. The flaw was corrected
by the United Nations Charter, a document which stands as the symbol for the protection of human rights on an international scale. In
time, other international agreements, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, added vigor to the human rights movement.
At the same time, a contrary tendency entered the picture-the
problem of how to enforce human rights obligations. This is perhaps
the central problem in the law governing international human rights.
Yet, to Professor Henkin, the solution is quite simple:
Governments are impelled to observe international law because it
is in their interest to do so, from a wish to maintain order, to keep
the norms alive, to have the advantages of law they desire, and to
avoid the hostile reactions of the victim and other adverse con-

20. Id. at 34.
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sequences of violations. As a result, almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obli21
gations almost all of the time.
After a discussion of some of the factors which have retarded the
growth of the human rights movement and thereby led to disappointed expectations, Professor Henkin moves to an analysis of some
of the factors which may allow a brighter prospect for the future protection of human rights. Perhaps the strongest inspiration and
momentum, in the view of Professor Henkin, have come from the
new American attitude. The history of the United States as a guarantor of human rights for its citizens, the Constitution which stands as a
bulwark against arbitrary governmental infringment of human rights
and as a model for other nations, and the United States effort to
internationalize human rights, placed the United States at the eye of
the storm. The problem, of course, is that the United States has envisioned international human rights for others only, since it views itself as the model protector of human rights. Professor Henkin makes
the point:
Because we believe that human rights in the United States need
no international support; because we do not think we have anything to learn in human rights from others and we even fear dilution or "contamination" from them; because, though we continue
to assert that human rights are everybody's business, we make an
exception where those of our own citizens are concerned; because
we have always remained in some measure "isolationist," especially
resisting foreign "interference" here; because we fear that foreign
scrutiny might bring subversion, distortion, or hostile
propaganda-the United States has refused to be a full and equal
participant in the international human rights program. Most glaringly, it has adhered to virtually no human rights agreement of any
importance. 22
In the 1970's, however, changes occurred. The United States
enacted laws that would deny aid to foreign governments that consistently engaged in violations of human rights, and President Carter
and other executives spoke out in favor of human rights.
Professor Henkin finishes his essay on an upbeat note. According
to Professor Henkin, if one were to step into Thomas Paine's shoes in
1791 when he wrote The Rights of Man and look forward to today, or
to look backward from today to 1791, it is indeed remarkable the
progress we have made in the area of human rights. Yet I would
21. Id. at 101 (footnotes omitted).

22. id. at 118.
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register a note of skepticism about predictions of a proportionally
similar ascent in the next 200 years. Indeed, it is not at all clear that
the human rights movement is in as good condition as Professor
Henkin claims. Similarly, Professor Henkin does not give us any
reason to believe the future will be any brighter.
More specifically, I must register several objections to his
analysis-objections which strongly challenge his thesis that international commitments on human rights have increased protection for
individuals against arbitrary government intrusion. First, I do not see
that the building blocks for human rights protection are securely
cemented so that they can maintain their vigor if, indeed, they had
any to begin with. Second, and a standard question raised about the
viability of the enforcement capabilities of international human rights
agreements, is the question of sanctions. What can be done to nations
that refuse to protect human rights and, instead, deny the most
basic rights to certain groups of their citizenry? Take the Soviet
Union as an example. What sanctions exist to force the Soviets to
treat "refusniks" and other persecuted minorities in an equal manner
with other Soviet citizens? The answer, if one exists, is very little.
Although the United States may exert certain economic or other pressures on the Soviet Union in order to change their treatment of these
groups, the success of the pressure depends upon the incentives the
United States can offer the Soviets. And, even more importantly,
some critics claim that open discussion and exposure of human rights
violations may cause the Soviets to be even more intransigent and
therefore less willing to improve their treatment of these groups.
Other nations would seem less able to influence Russian behavior.
More broadly, and certainly more importantly for the international human rights movement, is the effectiveness of international
agreements in protecting individuals in the nations which are most
committed to human rights. The United States, for example, preaches
incessantly about the superiority of its system as a bulwark for human
rights. The Constitution, it is claimed, is a remarkable document for
many reasons, but particularly because it is a blueprint for the protection of individuals against government infringement. Thus, the argument goes, the United States need not concern itself with international human rights agreements. Rather, the United States should act
as a catalyst to encourage other nations to create and be bound by
international human rights agreements,23
23. Indeed, even when the United States has become a signatory to an international human rights agreement, the main impetus appears to have been symbolic.
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The United States, therefore, is signatory to very few international human rights agreements and ratifying state to even fewer such
agreements. Moreover, a strong argument can be made that the
United States does not follow even the spirit of some of the international human rights agreements to which it is a party. Instead, other
concerns -economic,
political, and social-assume preeminence to
the detriment of human rights on an international scale.
The immigration policies of the United States make the point.
For example, the United States has a long history as the valiant
champion of the displaced refugee. The United States, it is said, has
long embraced the political and social outcasts of other countries.
Indeed the Statue of Liberty loudly proclaims this view:
...Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuge of your teeming shore.
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me,
I lift my lamp beside the golden door! 24
For the present-day alien who attempts to obtain the status of asylum
within the United States, the majestic words inscribed on the Statue
of Liberty have a certain hollow ring.
The prime example is the Haitian situation. Scores of Haitian
nationals have been penetrating United States borders in recent
years. In 1972, for example, approximately two thousand Haitian nationals survived treacherous ocean journeys and attempted to enter
the United States. 25 Several thousand more made the same attempt
in the intervening years between 1972 and 1978. Many of the Haitians claim they are entitled to asylum within the United States and,
consequently, must be protected from return to Haiti, where they
would face persecution. In addition to a national law which is meant
to protect refugees against return to a nation in which they may face
persecution, the United States is a signatory to an international ag-

See, e.g., Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, done Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T.
6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267. In his letter of transmittal to the Senate
of Aug. 1, 1968, President Johnson claimed that "United States accession to the Protocol would thus constitute a significant and symbolic element in our ceaseless effort
to promote everywhere the freedom and dignity of the individual and of nations, and
to secure and preserve peace in the world.'" Letter of Transmittal, Exec. Doc. K,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. at IV (Star Print 1968).
24. E. LAZARUS, The New Colossus, in THE POEMS OF EMMA LAZARUS 202

(1888).
25. N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1977, at 19, col. 1.
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reement which has the same purpose-to protect refugees from
persecution-but which apparently is wider in scope. Yet most of the
Haitian claims have been denied by United States Immigration and
Naturalization officials. The basic reason is that other national
concerns-mostly economic, political, and social-outweigh United
States concern for international human rights.
A closer look at these provisions, and cases decided under their
mandate, proves the point. For example, the trick of obtaining
asylum status is to employ Section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 which authorizes the Attorney General to "withhold deportation of any alien within the United States to any country
in which in his opinion the alien would be subject to persecution on
account of race, religion or political opinion and for such a period of
time as he deems to be necessary for such reason." 26 Section 243(h)
thus creates a means by which a refugee or other alien, already in the
United States, whether legally or illegally, can remain here and avoid
return to a country in which he would be subject to persecution.
There is, however, no absolute right to political asylum in the United
States. Rather, asylum is dispensed solely as a matter of discretion.
Victims of persecution must, therefore, overcome formidable obstacles to be granted refuge in the United States. Moreover, reported
cases strongly suggest that 243(h) relief is extremely difficult to ob-

tain. 27
Additionally, the United Nations Protocol relating to the Status
of Refugees, 28 to which the United States adheres, and which incorporates the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 29 may be used in conjunction with Section 243(h) as authority
for claiming asylum within the United States.
The Convention, as modified by the Protocol, defines a refugee
as one who,
owing to well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and
being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a re-

26. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1970).
27. See, e.g., In re Dunar, Interim Decision No. 2192 (April 17, 1973).
28. 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
29. 19 U.S.T. 6260, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
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sult of such events, is unable or owing to such fear, is unwilling to
return to it. 30

Article 32, section 1, of the Convention requires that "[t]he Contracting States shall not expel a refugee lawfully in their territory save on
the grounds of national or public order." 31 Finally, Article 33, section 1, requires that
[n]o Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in
any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life
or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
2

opinion. 3

Several differences between Section 243(h) and the Protocol are immediately apparent. First, the Protocol states that an alien need only
establish that he has a "well-founded fear of being persecuted," while
under Section 243(h) it must be "the opinion of the Attorney General" that the alien would suffer persecution if deported. Despite the
plain difference between the language and standards of the Protocol
and Section 243(h), the courts have held that the more constrained
standard contained in Section 243(h) applies to asylum claims raised
pursuant to the Protocol. 33 Thus, fewer aliens are permitted to remain within the United States than would otherwise be the case if
the spirit of the international agreement was adhered to. Second, and
perhaps the Protocol's only utility as construed by United States
courts, is that it offers two additional grounds-nationality and membership in a social group-for requesting asylum. Finally, and
perhaps more importantly, Article 33 appears to allow no room for
the exercise of the Attorney General's discretion. The Article's provisions seem to be mandatory and therefore directly conflict with Section 243(h), which has been construed to give broad discretion to the
Attorney General. Once again, however, constructions have transmuted the Convention into Section 243(h), and held that Article 33
34
does not affect the Attorney General's discretion.
30. 19 U.S.T. 6260, 6261, as modified by Art. I § 2, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 6225,
T.I.A.S. No. 6577, Art. I. § a(2), 189 U.N.T.S. 152.
31. 19 U.S.T. 6260, 6275, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
32. 19 U.S.T. 6260, 6276, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 176.
33. See Pierre v. United States, 547 F.2d 1281, 1288 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated and
remanded, 98 S.Ct. 498 (1977); Ming v. Marks, 367 F. Supp. 673, 677-78 (S.D.N.Y.
1973), aff d., 505 F.2d 1170 (2d Cir. 1974); Kan Kam Lin v. Rinaldi, 361 F. Supp.
177 (D.C.N.J. 1973), aff'd., 493 F.2d 1229 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 874
(1974). But see Sannon v. United States, 427 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D.Fla. 1977), vacated
and remanded, 566 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1978).
34. See, e.g., In re Dunar, supra note 27.

BOOK COMMENTARY

What explanations exist for these strained interpretations? What
answers exist for the United States' reluctance to serve as a humanitarian refuge for some of the world's displaced? Why is the United
States, the leading exponent of human rights in the world today, refusing to accept even the spirit of an international agreement?
Several observations are in order. First, it is abundantly clear
that other factors besides an international agreement motivate
nation-states. Second, since the United States is abridging its international obligations, can one expect other nations perhaps less committed to human rights to live up to any international human rights
agreements? Third, and more generally, construction of Section
243(h) and the Convention raise the question of whether meaningful
provisions for asylum are compatible with a national policy, reflected
in a quota system, that severely limits entry to the United States.
Moreover, a fundamental tension exists between the economicallymotivated exclusionary provisions of the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952 and the nation's presumed public ideology of protecting
such important human rights as political, social, and religious freedoms. Given the national practice prior to the adoption of a limited
immigration policy-wide open acceptance of aliens-it is difficult to
argue that such an ideology finds meaning only within the boundaries
of the United States. Further exacerbating this tension are the political imperatives of a world power which apparently undercut both the
public ideology and the practical effect of the refugee provisions. 3 5
More broadly, the argument made by Professor Henkin-that
international agreements on human rights will buttress and promote
rights on a worldwide basis-seems particularly suspect. And this
criticism, of course, speaks largely to his description of the historical

35. This tension is seen in other immigration laws which protect aliens who have
fled from Communist nations while aliens who have fled from non-Communist nations are not similarly protected. See 8 U.S.C. 1153(a)(7) (1970). The contrast is particularly sharp when Haitian aliens are compared with those from a "Communist or
Communist dominated country." Literally scores of aliens have been admitted to the
United States under this statute. The same, of course, cannot be said for the Haitians
since they have not fled from a Communist nation. In addition, thousands of Cubans
have been granted refuge in the United States under a statute enacted specifically to
protect those who have fled from Castro's Cuba. Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No.
89-732, 80 Stat. 1161, 8 U.S.C. 1255 (1970). Query: Is a dictatorial regime which
blatantly abuses the human rights of its citizens to be favored over another nation
because the former is not defined as Communist while the latter is? Are human
rights violations to be tolerated because of the definition of a political/economic system as capitalist as opposed to Communist? The immigration policies of the United
States answer a resounding yes to this question.
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development of human rights. Perhaps positivist law in the form of
binding international agreements is not the solution. In sum, a prognosis on the progress of human rights appears less optimistic than
Professor Henkin asserts. Perhaps Thomas Paine would be less impressed with the future of human rights than Professor Henkin.

